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Smolla 
Argues Before 
Cross-burning 
_case explores 
free-speech 
controversy 
By John G. Douglass 
A First Amendment advocate's greatest burden can be his own client. 
1bose clientS range from the ojjbeat to the da.ngerous, from pornog-
raphers to neo-Nazis. Yet in standing up for the disreputabk client, 
the free sprech admcale stands for one of 011r most cherished freedoms: 
"If there is a bedrock principk underlying the First Amendment. et 
is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply beca11Se society finds the ilka itself offensitie or disagrmlhk." 
Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
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As one of the nation's leading First Amend-
ment advocates, Allen Professor Rodney 
Smolla understands that burden as well as 
anyone. No doubt he felt it keenly at 10:31 
a.m. on Dec. 11, 2002, when he rose be-
fore a packed gallery in the U.S. Supreme 
Court to argue that the First Amendment 
protects symbolic speech, even when the 
symbol is as repulsive as a Klansman's 
burning cross. 
Virginia v. Black was Smolla's first oral 
argument before the Supreme Court, but his 
appearance on the national stage of First 
Amendment controversy was nothing new. 
Among academics, Smolla has long been 
regarded as a leading First Amendment voice. 
His publications include a widely-used 
casebook, top law review articles, plays, 
short stories, a forthcoming novel, and a 
nonfiction work that became the script for a 
popular movie. As a litigator of two decades 
experience, he has argued First Amendment 
appeals in dozens of state and federal courts 
around the nation. Early in his career, he 
had a knack for finding big First Amendment 
cases. These days, such cases find him. 
Smolla first encountered the case of Barry 
Elton Black in September 1998. A month 
earlier, Black had led a Ku Klux Klan rally 
on a Carroll County farm, where he ignited 
a thirty-foot cross that was visible from a 
three-quarter mile stretch of public highway. 
Charged under a Virginia statute that makes 
it a felony to bum a cross "with the intent 
of intimidating any person," Black asked 
the Virginia Chapter of the American Civil 
liberties Union to take his case. Along with 
Richmond criminal defense lawyer David 
Baugh, Smolla sat on an ACLU committee 
that considered the request. Baugh stepped 
forward to represent Black at trial, while 
Smolla agreed to handle any resulting ap-
peals. Both Baugh and Smolla served pro 
bono. Smolla took the case partly out of 
admiration for Baugh, an African-American, 
who had the courage to represent a white 
racist in a highly visible case. And - as 
Smolla later remarked - he took the case 
to prove a point: "Freedom of speech only 
matters where the speech is unpopular." 
Over the course of three years Smolla 
briefed and argued Black's appeals, first to 
the Virginia Court of Appeals, then to the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, where the case 
was consolidated after oral argument with 
a separate appeal from Virginia Beach. In 
that case, two youths had been convicted 
under the same Virginia cross-burning 
statute for trying to bum a small wooden 
cross in the yard of an African-American 
neighbor. On Nov. 2, 2001, by the narrow 
margin of 4 to 3, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia reversed all three convictions. 
The Virginia decision immediately 
attracted widespread attention. Many mis-
understood its effect, wrongly concluding 
that it left law enforcement powerless to 
stop those who use the burning cross as a 
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tool of intimidation. In fact, the Virginia 
Supreme Court struck down the statute on a 
far more limited ground, holding that it 
violated the First Amendment because it 
singled out a particular form of symbolic 
speech - cross-burning - based solely on 
the speaker's point of view, while it left 
other forms of threatening speech untouched. 
Indeed, even as Virginia's attorney general 
sought to appeal the Black decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the General Assembly enacted 
new legislation that avoided the First 
Amendment issue simply by making it a 
crime to bum "an object" for the purpose of 
intimidation. 
The landscape of First Amendment law is 
mapped in broad strokes, and Virginia's 
decision fell into a troubled no-man's land. 
The U.S. Supreme Court had struck down a 
Minnesota cross-burning statute 10 years 
earlier in RA. V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377 (1992), but that opinion left more ques-
tions than answers. In 10 years, courts in 
four states had invalidated cross-burning 
statutes, while three state supreme courts had 
upheld them. When the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Virginia v. Black, the 
stage was set to settle that controversy. And 
the case carried much broader First Amend-
ment implications. The line between true 
threats and intimidating conduct - which 
the law can punish - on the one hand, and 
obnoxious or hateful speech - which the 
First Amendment protects - on the other, 
has never been a simple line to draw. Sym-
bolic speech - like a burning American 
flag, a burning draft card or a burning cross 
- only magnifies the line-drawing prob-
lem. Symbols are powerful rhetorical 
devices, but they can be ambiguous. And 
the use of a symbol blurs any easy distinc-
tion between speech and conduct. Given 
the high stakes, it was not surprising when 
15 states filed amicus briefs in support of 
Virginia's statute, while First Amendment 
interest groups as diverse as the Thomas 
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free 
Expression and the Rutherford Institute 
filed briefs urging the Court to strike down 
the cross-burning statute. The Solicitor 
General of the United States filed an amicus 
brief as well, largely to protect the 
government's ability to prosecute cross 
burning under federal civil rights statutes. 
In a case of such national note, preparation 
for oral argument is not a solitary affair. 
With the aid of colleagues around the country, 
Smolla organized a series of "mootings." 
Before he faced the real court, Smolla was 
grilled five times by panels featuring retired 
federal judges, former Supreme Court 
clerks and noted academics. Closer to 
home, University law faculty joined Smolla's 
students in the moot courtroom to play roles 
as Supreme Court justices, peppering Smolla 
with tough questions. Undergraduates par-
ticipated too, in a student forum at the Jepson 
School. There, Smolla learned that non-
lawyers were moved more by the terrifying 
symbolism of the burning cross than by the 
niceties of First Amendment line-drawing. 
A lunchtime debate with the law school's 
John Marshall scholars was especially pro-
ductive. Smolla presented one of the 
government's most compelling arguments: 
that cross-burning could be outlawed because 
a burning cross is, by definition, a threat of 
violence, and real threats can be punished 
without violating the First Amendment. A 
student responded with a hypothetical. What 
if, the student asked, a terrorist group in-
vented a symbol which it used solely as a 
''Freedom of s eech 
onl matters where the 
Rodney Smolla 
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calling card before acts of violence? What 
if, years later, a dissident political group 
adopted the same symbol for the purpose 
of shocking audiences and calling attention 
to its political message? 
The point was subtle but significant. 
Symbols are not static. One generation's 
threat may be another's political manifesto. 
To outlaw the symbol itself, for all time, is 
to ignore the reality that symbols, like spoken 
words, can change meaning over time. Smolla 
liked the argument, and it became part of 
his arsenal for December 11. He would 
need it, and more. 
The early morning of December I I brought 
an ice storm to Washington, D.C., enough 
to convince Richmonders to try Amtrak, rather 
than 1-95. The Washington press corps arrived 
in taxicabs, with badges announcing their 
pedigrees in large print - ABC, CBS, CNN, 
Los Angeles Times - as they crammed 
through the metal detectors at the court's 
north entrance. The reporters had the luxury 
of a cup of coffee in the pressroom, where 
a sign occupying most of a wall read: 
"Amendment I: Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press." It was an omen, perhaps, but 
one never seen by counsel, who shook off 
their overcoats then headed up marble steps 
and through the immense oak doors that 
separate the Great Hall from the Supreme 
Court Chamber. 
The room was beginning to fill as Smolla 
took the respondent's seat just to the left of 
counsel's podium. Ten feet in front of him 
rose the court's bench, polished 
mahogany spreading 60 feet from side to 
side to accommodate nine black leather 
chairs. It seemed designed to leave counsel 
surrounded, unable to see justices at one 
end while responding to a question from 
the other flank. Today, that effect would be 
magnified by the absence of Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, whose recuperation 
from surgery would leave the advocates 
standing before an empty seat, with four 
black robes looming on either side. The 
gavel sounded at 10:02 a.m. 
The argument began routinely enough. 
Virginia's state solicitor, William Hurd, 
seized the opening moment to argue that 
the Virginia statute was aimed at threaten-
ing conduct, not at the content of the cross-
burner's obnoxious message. 
"Our statute," Hurd argued, "does not ban 
all cross-burning, only cross-burning used 
to threaten bodily harm." Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor turned the argument into a trap, 
pointing out a "troublesome" passage in the 
statute that allowed juries to infer an "intent 
to intimidate" from the act of cross-burning 
alone. Her question set the tone for the next 
15 minutes, which occupied Hurd largely 
in a technical debate over inferences and 
jwy instructions. As Hurd sat down, it seemed 
that the court might be headed toward a 
narrow decision, striking down the "inferred 
intent" part of the statute and avoiding the 
main First Amendment issues. 
U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Michael 
Dreeben spoke next. 
"Virginia has singled out cross-burning 
with the intent to intimidate because it is a 
particularly threatening form of such conduct." 
Dreeben never had to finish the point. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, who rarely 
speaks during oral argument, finished it for 
him. "We had almost 100 years of lynching 
and activity in the South by the ... Ku Klux 
Klan ... and the cross was a symbol of that 
reign of terror." In a courtroom stunned to 
silence by the passionate words and the 
personal tone of the court's lone African-
American, Thomas continued, "It is unlike 
any symbol in our society. There was no 
other purpose to the cross .. .It was intended 
to cause fear and to terrorize a population. " 
In an instant, the tone of the argument had 
changed and its significance had exploded. 
The case was no longer about intricate dis-
tinctions posed by statutory language. 
History, Thomas had suggested, can make 
a symbol so dangerous that the government 
can simply remove it from public sight. A 
huge stack of First Amendment chips had 
just been thrust on the table. And now it 
was 10:31 a.m. 
Smolla stepped to the podium without 
notes, knowing he would have no time to 
look at them. The next 30 minutes would be 
the most intense of his career as an advocate, 
and he wanted to focus on the justices. He 
was less than a full sentence into the argument 
when Justice Antonin Scalia picked up on 
Thomas' theme, comparing a burning cross 
to a brandished firearm. Justice David H. 
Souter joined in, "How does your argument 
account for the fact that the cross has 
acquired a potency ... at least equal to that 
of a gun?" Scalia piled on, "If you were a 
black man at night, you'd rather see a man 
with a rifle than see a burning cross on your 
front lawn." 
Struggling to defuse the emotion of the 
moment, Smolla responded in a measured 
tone, "I totally accept the history that Justice 
Thomas has recounted." Then he redirected 
the argument. 
"As powerful as all of those points are, 
there's not a single interest that society seeks 
to protect [by banning cross-burning] that 
cannot be vindicated ... as well ... by content-
neutral alternatives." The tactic worked, at 
least momentarily, as the discussion shifted 
to the court's decision in R.A. V. But as his 
time wound down, Smolla sensed he had to 
confront the history of cross-burning head on. 
He turned to the hypothetical he had vetted 
weeks earlier with the John Marshall scholars. 
"Even if at a given moment in time you 
could take some symbol and freeze it and 
say ... this symbol always seems associated 
with violence . .. " Smolla began. Justice 
Stephen G. Breyer interrupted Smolla in 
mid-sentence while nodding, "You have a 
very interesting point." 
The exchange offered Smolla a moment's 
opening to drive home his theme. Yes, his-
torically cross-burning has been about 
intimidation. But it can also convey ideas. 
While the government may punish threats of 
violence that may accompany cross burning, 
Smolla argued, it must do so without punish-
ing the political and social message of the 
cross-burner, no matter how offensive and 
hateful the content of that message. 
Moments after e argument endeo pundits 
stood in the icy rain on the courthouse steps, 
recounting Justice Thomas' passionate speech 
and speculating that it signaled the court's 
willingness to ban cross-burning. Surrounded 
by staff members, Virginia Attorney General 
Jerry Kilgore spoke to a television audience 
about "freedom from fear. " Smolla faced the 
cameras alone and responded, ''The point of 
the First Amendment is that we protect even 
the ideas that most of us find reprehensible." 
Oral arguments are an imperfect window 
into the Supreme Court's decisioncmaking 
process. The court's final word will come 
later this spring. When the courtroom drama 
ended in Virginia v. Black, only one thing 
was clear: defending free speech is not for 
the faint of heart. In the court's basement 
cafeteria, Smolla had less than an hour to 
unwind before appearing for a panel dis-
cussion with the National Association of 
Attorneys General. His afternoon was 
already filled with scheduled interviews 
and talk show appearances, and his cell 
phone was crowded with requests for more. 
A friend asked what it felt like to argue before 
the high court. "Like walking into a buzz 
saw," Smolla quipped. "But I'd do it again 
tomorrow. " 
In all likelihood, he will. 
john G. Do11glass was a lawyer in private practice 
and a federal prosec11tor be/ ore joining the law 
school f ac11lty. 
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